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Abstract—We define secure operations with tree-formed, pro-
tected verification data registers. Functionality is conceptually
added to Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) to handle Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs) which represent roots of hash
trees protecting the integrity of tree-formed Stored Measurement
Logs (SMLs). This enables verification and update of an inner
node of an SML and even attestation to its value with the same
security level as for ordinary PCRs. As an important application,
it is shown how certification of SML subtrees enables attestation
of platform properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
The process of building trust in computing platforms follows
a unique, common pattern [1]. All components of the platform
are measured by a protected entity on the platform before
they are loaded and executed. The generation of a chain of
trust, which extends without gaps from system boot up to
the current system state is an important concept for a Trusted
Computing System. To prevent unmonitored execution of code
between measurement and actual execution, every component
is required to measure and report the following component
before executing it, while this measurement process is pro-
tected by the root of trust for measurement. Verification data
is compiled from the measurement values by a protected
operation and stored in protected storage. The verification data
identifies, after completion of secure start up, the platform’s
state uniquely. Specified by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG), the most important embodiments of these processes
are authenticated boot [2] and secure boot [3]. Secure boot
includes a local verification and enforcement engine that lets
components start only if their measurements are equal to
trusted reference values.
In [4], a modification of the extend operation of TPMs was
described which allows a verification data register, i.e., a PCR,
to protect the root of a Merkle hash tree, which is stored
in a tree-formed SML. This exposes a new TPM command,
TPM_Tree_Extend, which assures that a sequence of mea-
surements of system components and/or data are organised
into a binary tree of which a designated verification data
register is the root. Tree-formed SML extends the verification
data from the root register to a complex data structure. It
has various usages, for instance the efficient search for failed
components, i.e., leaf measurements with undesired values.
In the present paper, we add more trusted functionalities
to operate on tree-formed verification data. We show how
inner nodes of a tree-formed SML with its root protected in
a verification data register, can be verified for integrity, and
updated with a new value, in a controlled way maintaining the
overall security level. Finally, we introduce a variant of the
TPM_Quote command for inner tree nodes, which attests to
their integrity precisely as TPM_Quote does for an ordinary
PCR’s value. With the defined set of commands, the integrity
measurement functionality of a TPM is complemented by a
comprehensive set of commands operating with tree-formed
PCRs and SMLs. Using them, tree-formed verification and
validation data can be used with far more flexibility and
expressiveness than linearly chained TPM PCRs and SMLs.
Section II introduces a basic system model and notation.
Section III defines the TPM command extensions described
above, and also proposes some pertinent structural extensions
and basic usage categories for such operations. As a central
use case for the introduced commands, Section IV exhibits a
protocol for certification of the root node of a subtree in a
tree-formed SML by a trusted third party. We conclude with
Section V with a brief assessment of the tree-formed platform
validation approach and an outlook to future work. The reader
is referred to [4] for an overview of related work. More related
work is discussed as the concepts are developed.
II. PREPARATIONS
In this section, the minimal necessary elements and ca-
pabilities of a platform, which are required subsequently,
are described. While we are leaning on TCG-nomenclature
and some concepts, it will be clear from these minimal
requirements, that the concepts developed in the following
sections are not restricted to platforms and secure hardware
elements adhering to TCG standards, e.g., TPMs [5] and
systems designed according to the PC Client specification [2].
A. System Model
The tree-formation variant of the extend operation defined
in [4], operates inside a TPM, takes only a single measurement
value as input, and is otherwise inert with regard to the system
outside the TPM. This is not the case for the update function
which is introduced in the present paper. The latter operates
on a certain number r of verification data registers V , V def=
{V1, . . . , Vr} protected inside a TPM, and on the hash tree
data stored outside the TPM in less protected storage. That
is, the hash tree contained in the Stored Measurement Log
(SML) is managed by a Trusted Software Stack (TSS) which
is authorised to access the TPM functions necessary for the
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update operations. TSS calls TPM via an authorised, integrity-
protected command interface. Note that, while we use TCG
parlance for practical reasons, the concepts presented here and
in [4] are not restricted to a TCG TPM and platform. We only
assume a hardware-protected set of verification data registers
and an extend operation. The latter is defined by the ordinary
TPM extend operation
V ← V m def= H (V ‖m) , (1)
where V denotes a verification data register, H is a collision-
resistant hash function (SHA-1 in case of the TPM), and m =
H(data) is a measurement value. In the following  is used
liberally with arbitrary registers V as arguments, where no
confusion can arise.
B. Conventions
We assume that the SML contains a binary tree of depth d
resulting from a binary one-way operation, such as the Merkle
hash tree [6], [7] produced by the TPM_Tree_Extend
command introduced in [4]. Natural coordinates for inner
nodes and leaves are binary strings of length 1, . . . , d, where
the length ` of the string is the level in the tree on which
the node resides. Let n be an inner node or leaf and write
n ∼ 〈n〉 = (n1, . . . , n`) ∈ {0, 1}×` for the binary represen-
tation of the coordinates of n. Let 〈n〉k = nk, k = 1, . . . , `,
be the k-th digit of 〈n〉. Where no confusion can arise, we
identify a node with its value (e.g., 160-Bit hash value) in the
SML, while distinguishing it from its coordinate. Otherwise
we write n = (n, 〈n〉) for the value-coordinate pair of a node.
The trace T of n is the ordered list of all inner nodes on
the path from n to the root, including n, i.e.,
T(n) = (t1, . . . , t`), where tk ∼ (n1, . . . , nk). (2)
The natural partial order of nodes is written as m ≤ n, which
is equivalent to n ∈ T(m). The partial order extends to sets
M , N of nodes by setting M ≤ N iff ∀m ∈ M : ∃n ∈
N : m ≤ n.
The reduced tree R of n is the list of all siblings of its
trace. This is readily expressed in natural coordinates.
R(n) = (r1, . . . , r`), where rk ∼ (n1, . . . ,¬nk), (3)
where ¬ denotes binary negation.
We use the hash chain operation x  y def= H(x‖y), with
fixed-length input hash values x, y, in a variant which makes
argument order dependent on a binary parameter. We set, for
c ∈ {0, 1},
〈x|c|y〉 =
{
x  y if c = 1;
y  x if c = 0.
This chiral Merkle-Damgård operation is a version of an
extend operation which allows to distinguish between left and
right siblings in a tree and calculate their parent node in the
correct order. Neglecting implementation issues, we assume
that the (extended) TPM is capable of performing the operation
〈·|·|·〉 internally.
In many cases, the hash tree stored in the SML may be
incomplete, i.e., contain empty leaves and inner nodes, denoted
by nil. For the consistent treatment of nil nodes in a Merkle
hash tree, it is useful to assume that nil is a two-sided unit
for the operation , i.e.,
x  nil = nil  x = x, and nil  nil = nil. (4)
This is a re-interpretation of the usual TPM extend operation
and can also be used to model a direct write to a V ∈ V , by
first resetting V to nil and then performing V  x for some
value x. For the implementation of this convention, we may
assume that nil is be represented as a flag of verification data
registers and the inputs and output of 〈·|·|·〉. For a V , the
nil flag may be set by a particular reset command. When nil
is encountered as the input of an extend operation to a V ,
then logic of the TSS, or a TPM modification, may prevent
execution of the extend and write to the PCR directly.
III. SECURE OPERATIONS WITH TREE NODES
This main section presents the operational extensions of a
standard TPM to operate securely with tree-formed SMLs.
The protection goal is to achieve the same assurance level for
inner nodes and leaves of such an SML, as for a conventional
verification data register value, protected in a PCR. We first
describe the update of a root by a new node value, and then
show further structural and command extensions for use with
tree-formed verification data.
The strategy for a secure update of an inner node or leaf of
a SML tree is as follows. First, the current value of that node
needs to be verified for authenticity. This is done by recalculat-
ing the root of the tree, protected in a register V , (which is kept
fixed in the remainder of the paper to simplify presentation) us-
ing the data contained in the reduced hash tree associated with
the node. This verification must be a protected operation inside
the TPM, called TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load. It
also loads the verified reduced tree data into a set of verifica-
tion data registers for use with the subsequent update operation
TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update. This function takes a new
value for the node to be updated, and uses the reduced tree data
to update the parent nodes up to the root V . Both commands
may be used separately for various purposes, e.g. standalone
node integrity verification. For convenience, they may also be
combined into a single node and root update command.
A. Verified Load of a Reduced Tree
Suppose n is the node of an SML tree of depth d at level
` ≤ d with root protected in a verification data register V ∈
V . The first step to update V with a new value for n, is to
verify that the reduced tree R(n) is untampered in the SML.
To maintain the security level of V , this verification needs
to be performed by a TPM-protected operation as well. For
this, TSS calls TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load with
arguments (〈n〉,n,R(n)). Choose ` + 1 available registers
from V and call them B1, . . . , B`, and V ∗. Algorithm 1 shows
how an SML node is verified and its reduced tree is loaded
into a set of verification data registers.
The chiral extend used centrally in this algorithm ensures
correct order of the child nodes in the calculation of their
parent element on the trace of n. The TSS obtains the
calculated trace T(n) and the verification status as return
values. Algorithm 1 requires `+1 additional verification data
registers.
Algorithm 1 TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load
Require: B1, . . . , B`, V ∗ ∈ V, (〈n〉,n,R(n))
Ensure: B1 ← r1, . . . , B` ← r`, V ∗ ← n
. Initialise buffer with reduced tree and node to verify.
1: for k = `, . . . , 1 do
2: V ∗ → TSS
3: V ∗ ← 〈Bk|〈n〉k |V ∗〉
4: end for
5: if V ≡ V ∗ then
6: return V
7: else
8: return “verification error”
9: end if
A simple variant of Algorithm 1 can operate using only a
single verification data register, by processing the reduced tree
sequentially, without storing the reduced tree inside the TPM.
This auxiliary command TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify
may be useful for a plain verification of the SML by the TSS or
another party. This is shown in Algorithm 2. The serialisation
of R(n) required by this variant may be done using an input
buffer realised in a software layer below the TSS, e.g., a TPM
device driver, or by corresponding TPM internal logic.
Algorithm 2 TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify
Require: B ∈ V, (〈n〉,n,R(n))
Ensure: B ← n . Initialise buffer with node to verify.
1: for k = `, . . . , 1 do
2: B → TSS
3: B ← 〈rk|〈n〉k |B〉
4: end for
5: if V ≡ B then
6: return V
7: else
8: return “verification error”
9: end if
Like the original tree formation algorithm of [4], Algo-
rithms 1 and 2 use non-standard operations, in particular chiral
extend. Since the output target of chiral extend is always a
verification data register, the operation can be implemented
by loading the other argument into another verification data
register (if it is not already there, as in Algorithm 1), and
preceding the TPM-internal operation  with a register swap,
depending on the middle argument of chiral extend. This
ensures the same protection level for all arguments.
B. Full Node Verification
The verification performed by algorithms 1 and 2 has a
limited meaning since it only assures the integrity of the input
node value with respect to the input reduced tree. In case of
an integrity breach of the SML tree, more detailed information
is desirable. We can obtain at least the tree level at which an
integrity breach occurs, by performing the validation strategy
via downward tree-traversal described in [4].
The command TPM_Tree_Node_Verify shown in Al-
gorithm 3 returns the level at which an incorrect reduced tree
and/or trace element first broke the integrity chain from the
root to n. It obviously does not allow to determine which
sibling broke the chain. Further diagnostics would only be
possible when a reference tree is available, see [4].
Algorithm 3 TPM_Tree_Node_Verify
Require: B,C,D ∈ V, (〈n〉,R(n),T(n))
Ensure: C ← V . Initialise comparison register with root.
1: for k = 1, . . . , ` do
2: B,D ← tk . Load trace child into buffers
3: B ← 〈rk|〈n〉k |B〉
4: if C ≡ B then
. Compare result with current parent, and if OK,
5: C ← D
. make the trace element just verified the new parent.
6: else
7: return “verification error at level ” || k, B
8: end if
9: end for
10: return “OK”
C. Root Update
Assume that TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load
has been performed for a node n which shall now
be updated with a new value n′. The command
Algorithm 4 TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update
Require: 〈n〉, n′
Ensure: B1 = r1, . . . , B` = r`
1: V ← n′
2: for k = `, . . . , 1 do
3: V → TSS
4: V ← 〈Bk|〈n〉k |V 〉
5: end for
6: return V
TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update is called with argument n′
and may exclusively operate on the result of a determined,
preceding TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load, which
also fixes the node coordinate 〈n〉 and the register V to be
updated. To achieve this binding in a command sequence,
various methods can be employed. First, the TPM can store
and manage states and additional data for tree operations
as described in Section III-E. Furthermore the sequence
of commands TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load
and TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update should be bound
cryptographically, for instance by rolling nonces as
implemented by TPM protected OIAP/OSAP authorised
command sessions [5, p. 60ff]. Finally, the two
commands may be joined to a single update command
TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update, with arguments
(〈n〉,n,n′,R(n)). The node update commands return the
new trace of n′ and the new value of V , with which the TSS
then updates the SML.
D. Verification Data Register States
With the association of verification data registers
to certain nodes or roots of hash trees, and the
associated commands TPM_Tree_Extend (defined
in [4]), TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load,
TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update, these registers V acquire
statefulness. States of particular importance may be
• Active Root (AR) signifying a root of an SML tree cur-
rently under construction by the TPM_Tree_Extend
operation.
• Complete Root (CR) signifying the root of a tree which
is the completed result of the measurement of a number
of components, i.e., TPM_Tree_Extend operations.
AR can transition to CR when the tree is full, i.e.,
contains 2d leaf measurements, or triggered by the TSS
if it is desired to close a tree at a certain stage. A
V in CR state should be protected against further up-
dates with TPM_Tree_Extend, but may be accessed
by TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update or even the normal
TPM_Extend operation depending on policies and au-
thorisation.
• Tree Build (TB) signifying a register used to
build an active tree in another, AR register by the
TPM_Tree_Extend operation.
• Reduced Tree Node (RT) signifying the result of
TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load, i.e., one of the
registers Bk. An RT V must be protected until the corre-
sponding TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update, or another,
authorised command occurs.
When more than one tree is managed, V s’ states need to
be associated to their respective trees, e.g., using Unique
Identifiers (UIDs). Furthermore node coordinates may need
to be stored for each or some register(s). These data could be
held in a Verification Data Allocation Table (VDAT) inside
the TPM, and managed by a Tree Data Management Unit
(TDMU).
E. Quoting a Tree Node
TPM protected verification of a node value enables a
new core semantic for platform validation by attestation.
In particular, we can define a variant of TPM_Quote that
attests to a certain node value. In its most elementary form,
such a command TPM_Tree_Node_Quote is called with
the same arguments as TPM_Quote plus the arguments
of TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify. It then executes Algo-
rithm 2, but additionally keeps a copy of n in another PCR V ′.
Upon success it executes TPM_Quote on V ′. The receiver of
such a quote should be made aware that the signature obtained
is over an SML tree’s inner node. One possibility would be
to change the fixed string contained in the signed blob of the
TPM_Quote command, which normally is “QUOT” [5, Part
3, line 2794 on page 161], to, say, “TREEQUOT”.
Attestation to a node value with this command provides to
the node the same security assertion as quoting a verification
data register (PCR) value with TPM_Quote. However, it
bears the additional semantics that the value corresponds to
some inner node of an SML tree, i.e., it effectively attests
to the state of a certain subtree of which n is the root.
To explicitly convey this semantics to a validator, additional
data may be included in the AIK (Attestation Identity Key)
signed attestation package, e.g., a string “Tree Node”. The
meaning of such an attribute can be sensibly strengthened,
if it is only assigned by TPM_Tree_Node_Quote if the
root register is a controlled SML root register resulting from
TPM_Tree_Extend commands, i.e., it is in the CR state,
cf. Section III-D. This control should be part of the quote
generation.
For the validation of an attestation message, the val-
idator needs only the value n of the quoted node n =
(n, 〈n〉). More information transfer to the validator is in
principle not necessary, therefore the above description of
TPM_Tree_Node_Quote follows a principle of minimal
revelation. A variant of the command may also sign the node
coordinate 〈n〉, if the position of the node in the SML tree
matters for validation. Extended validation data transferred to
a validator could also include the reduced tree of n and root
verification data register, where this makes sense.
As a straightforward alternative, it would be possible to
task the validator with the verification of the reduced tree.
This approach is used in [8] to attest to the integrity of
Web pages delivered by a Web server, and to bind this
to an attestation of the server’s state using the ordinary
TPM_Quote command. This brings us to a variant realisa-
tion of TPM_Tree_Node_Quote, simply as follows. The
command receives as arguments the node value n, the node
values of R(n), and a selector for the root V . The TPM signs1
this (concatenated) data after controlling the CR state of V and
with a “REDTREEQUOT” fixed string attribute.
The first and second realisation variant for quoting an
inner node represent opposite possibilities, in the sense that
the first puts verification load with the platform, while the
second puts it with the validator. Therefore, both may have
different domains of practical efficiency. For instance, many,
distributed validating platforms as in M2M communication for
the first, and many, distributed validators (such as the Web
clients in [8]) for the second variant. But note that the second
1Note that in [8], a workaround method is used to bind a reduced tree to a
quote from a TPM, by inserting a hash of these additional data into the nonce
input of the TPM_Quote command, which is normally used to guarantee
freshness of the quote.
variant has, by principle drawbacks with regard to information
revelation of the platform, since the validator is shown the
complete state represented by V . This may be detrimental to
privacy.
F. Baseline Applications
The various extensions of the TPM integrity measurement
functionalities introduced in this paper and [4] can be
grouped into the following categories. TPM_Tree_Extend
is used in the (continuous) measurement process
that builds a particular SML tree with PCR-
protected root. TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load,
TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify, and ultimately
TPM_Tree_Node_Verify are commands for
platform-internal diagnostics. Apart from the usage of
TPM_Reduced_Tree_Verify_Load as a preparation
step to TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update, they may
be used to verify certain properties of a platform,
represented by SML subtrees, before other events
can happen. TPM_Reduced_Tree_Update and
TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update are used for
the controlled update of subtrees. Particular usages of an
inner node update operation are
• Update of a single system component. In this case the
new value updates a leaf.
• Update of a system module represented by a subtree. In
this case the root of the new subtree updates an inner
node of the original tree.
Finally, TPM_Tree_Node_Quote is the command which
makes tree-formed SML usable for validation of a platform by
a remote party. It exhibits the key new element of validation
using tree-formed data, namely the possibility to attest to
subtrees representing only a defined part of the system state.
A particular use case is described in the next section.
IV. SUBTREE CERTIFICATION
We come to a primary use case of the command extensions
introduced in Section III. One of the biggest open problems
of Trusted Computing is the association of semantics to
platform attestation. Existing TCG specifications define a bi-
lateral remote attestation in which executed code is measured
when it gets loaded. The measurements are stored in PCRs as
verification data, and the TPM attests to these data by signing
them with a TPM protected Attestation Identity Key (AIK).
Since a digest of a complete configuration is transmitted, the
verifier needs to know all configurations of all machines (at
all times, if system dynamics are considered). The transmitted
data for validation thus lacks expressiveness to enable versatile
and efficient remote platform validation. The need for semantic
attestation was recognised early on in [9] and later in [10],
who propose to restrict the scope of a single attestation to
a virtualised subsystem with limited complexity, allowing
for attestation of complex, dynamic, and high-level program
properties. In [11] and [12], [13] “property,” respectively,
“property-based attestation” (PBA) is proposed. PBA allows
to assure the verifier of security properties of the verified
platform via a trusted third party (TTP), called Subtree CA
(SCA). The SCA issues a certificate which maps the platforms
configuration to the properties (in particular desired/undesired
functionality) which can be fulfilled in this configuration.
Essentially, PBA moves the infrastructural problem of platform
validation to a SCA, similarly to, but extending the role of,
the TCG’s privacy CA. Certification of subtrees is one way
to fill the mentioned ideas with life. A related idea is that
of hardware-supported updates [14], performed by a new,
proposed TPM command, which re-seals data for another
platform configuration based on an update certificate. Also,
in [15] certificates over TPM-protected roots of hash tree are
generated by a specific TPM command, to certify the state
of certain protected counter objects. Differently from that,
the present paper proposes a specific client-server protocol to
obtain such a certificate from a trusted thrid party.
Let us fix some notions. In distinction to verification data,
we call validation data all data that can be submitted to another
party, the validator, and used to assess the trustworthiness
of the state of the platform. The process of submission of
validation data to the validator, for instance realised as remote
attestation according to TCG, and evaluation thereof by the
validator, is properly called validation. Validation data may
often comprise verification data such as quoted verification
data register (e.g., PCR) values. Validation may, beyond
cryptographic verification of verification data, include policy
evaluation and triggering of actions by the validator. See [1]
for further discussion.
Tree-formed verification data and validation data associ-
ated to an SML tree, provide structured data which can be
used complementary to the approaches above, to enhance
the semantics of platform attestation. Here we present one
fundamental method using tree-formed verification data to
realise concepts related to PBA. Namely, it is shown how a
SCA can replace a node in an SML tree with a meaningful,
trusted statement — a subtree certificate — about the subtree
of measured components of which latter node is the root. This
process realises a partial validation of the platform by the
SCA and results in a trusted assertion that is ingested in the
available validation data of the platform. This can later be used
toward another validator to validate the platform more fully.
In the next subsection we describe a generic base protocol
for subtree certification which is common for all conceivable
variant realisations and use cases. After that, particularities and
variants are considered in Subsections IV-B– IV-D.
A. Subtree Certification Protocol
Subtree certification is a process by which a Trusted Plat-
form (the combination of TPM and TSS in our simplified
model) obtains a certificate for the value of an inner node of a
tree-formed SML from a SCA. For this, the platform submits
a signed statement to the SCA, signifying that the node value
is contained in an SML tree of with root value protected in
a TPM verification data register. Based on this evidence , the
SCA can issue a certificate with additional attributes about
this node value to the platform, which is then ingested into
TPM TSS SCA
TPM_Tree_Node_Quote(s,a)
create quote P
create package Q
verify Q
create manifest Ms
create certificate Cs
create package R
create update
node list U
repeat 
for u in U
TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update(u)
T(u)
P
Q
R
update SML
wth T(u)
update root V
1
2
3
4
5
Phase
Fig. 1. Certification protocol for a subtree with root s.
the SML tree. The process essentially uses the protected tree
operations introduced in Section III above.
We assume that the platform possesses an active AIK a,
with certificate Ca issued by a trusted Privacy CA (PCA).
We further assume that communication between the platform
and the SCA is encrypted and integrity-protected to mitigate
man-in-the-middle attacks. An inner node s is selected for
certification. How this is done, shall concern us later in
Subsection IV-D. In the protocol, we do not mention failure
conditions and negative responses. With these preparations,
the subtree certification protocol proceeds in five phases, as
depicted in Figure 1.
Phase 1 creates a quote over s. For this, TSS calls
TPM_Tree_Node_Quote with arguments (〈s〉, s,R(s), a)
(note that Figure 1 shows only essential arguments for brevity)
and receives back
P = Siga(s).
If the root of the tree, i.e. the register V is selected for
certification, then TPM_Quote is to be used on V instead.
In phase 2, the TSS creates an attestation package Q. It
contains all necessary information for the verifying SCA, at
least
Q ⊆ {P, s, Ca, apub}.
(When the public part apub of a is not evident from Ca. Also,
the value of s may be known to SCA and then be omitted
from Q). More information may be included as necessary, for
instance the node coordinate 〈s〉, when it is part of the quote.
Q is sent (encrypted with a public encryption key of SCA and
integrity-protected) to SCA. This phase is similar as in remote
attestation specified by the TCG.
Phase 3 comprises the activities of SCA. First, SCA verifies
Q by verifying the signature of P and tracing the certificate
chain, up to the root certificate of the PCA, if necessary. If
the SCA recognises s as a node value which it can certify,
it creates a manifest Ms for it. This manifest may contain
additional information about the platform state associated with
the presence of the subtree with root s in the SML, such as a
time stamp, a functionality of the platform, the identification of
a module combined from the loaded components represented
by the leaf measurements of the subtree, or another platform
property. The manifest is the validation data added by subtree
certification which provides semantic meaning to the node
value s to a validator. Now, SCA can create a certificate for
s. This certificate, Cs, binds the properties represented by M
to the platform, by binding it to the AIK a. This can be done
essentially in two ways, namely
Cs =
{
SigSCA(Ms‖P ) if s is revealed;
SigSCA(Ms‖bind(a)) if s is concealed.
(5)
In the first case, SCA signs the manifest and the AIK-signed
node value, thus establishing an indirect binding to a. The
binding of Cs to a can then be verified if the platform
reveals the node value s. In the second option, the binding is
achieved directly, by letting the SCA sign some data bind(a)
which uniquely identifies a, such as a’s public part, Ca, the
serial number, or the fingerprint of Ca. In the semantics of
Public Key Infrastructures, Cs is, by the binding, an attribute
certificate associated with Ca. Finally, SCA creates a package
R containing at least Ms and Cs, and bind(a) in the second
case, and returns it to the platform.
Phase 4 prepares the update of the SML with certain data
derived from R. The SML update is an essential step to pro-
duce a binding association between the subtree certificate and
the certified node’s position 〈s〉 in the tree. Only this allows the
platform to assert to a validator that the property attested by
Cs and Ms is present in the platform’s configuration. Various
ways of SML update to bind Cs to the represented subtree are
conceivable, each suited differently for particular use cases.
This is discussed in Subsection IV-B, while we now state
generic features of the SML update process.
A set U = {u1, . . . ,uk} of new node nodes (values and
positions in the SML tree) is created with the following
properties. First, it must hold U ≤ s, so that only the subtree
below s is touched by the update. This is necessary, since all
old SML tree nodes n ≤ U strictly below U , i.e., n 6∈ U are
invalidated by the update, and can not be verified anymore with
respect to the updated root verification data register. Second,
U is dependency-free, i.e.,
@ u, u′ ∈ U : u ≤ u′.
Dependency-freeness is the essential property ensuring con-
sistency of the tree update by U with the one-way (upward)
information flow embodied in Merkle hash trees. In particular
it makes the update result independent of the order in which
elements of U are processed.
Phase 5 is the SML tree update proper. Iterating over
u ∈ U , TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update is called
with arguments (〈u〉,n,u,R(n)), where n is the old SML
node value at position 〈u〉. This returns the new trace T(u)
with which the TSS updates the SML. Executing the tree
update in the way described above maintains a consistent
security level for the SML and root verification data register.
Namely, the operation  is always executed inside the TPM.
When U contains many elements, it may not be efficient to
perform the update in the way described for Phase 5, since
TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update would in such a
case verify many overlapping reduced trees and thus incur
redundancy in (complex) hash calculations. A more efficient
update algorithm is described in Appendix A.
A variant of the subtree certification protocol could combine
the roles of PCA and SCA for AIK, respectively, subtree
certification in a single protocol run. An advantage would
be that no explicit generation and verification of an AIK
certificate Ca is necessary, because generation, activation, and
use of the AIK are bound into one session. This combination
of protocols is straightforward and left as an exercise to the
reader.
B. Certificate–Subtree Binding
Binding the received subtree certificate to the platform
state means binding it to the tree-formed SML in the cor-
rect configuration, i.e., the position of the certified subtree’s
root. As mentioned above, this is essential for meaningful
subtree certificate-based validation in the context of an overall
platform configuration. One particular goal of binding Cs to
the SML tree is integrity protection, since, for instance, later
replacement with a different certificate must be prevented. The
binding can be achieved by updating parts of the tree with data
which uniquely and verifiably identifies the subtree certificate.
A wide range of data items can be produced from the subtree
certificate and entered into the SML tree in various positions.
Here, we describe some of the more sensible options.
In the simplest case the SML update may be trivial and U
may be empty. This is only possible if Cs is composed by the
first option of (5), revealing s. Then s can just be retained in
the SML tree and whether the subtree below it is also retained
depends on the use case. The binding association is via the
actual node value s signed by Cs.
As another example, consider the case that all meaningful
data concerning the platform property attested by the certifi-
cate should be protected by the updated tree, e.g., for forensic
use. That is, the three data items s, Ms, and Cs shall enter the
update set. While the node value s is already in the correct data
format, the other two are first processed to m(Ms) and m(Cs).
The operation m can be the generation of a hash value by the
platform’s Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM), or another
appropriate one-way operation. If some data item already
contains suitable, uniquely identifying data of the appropriate
node value format, then it can be directly extracted and used as
node update value. A particular example could be a certificate
fingerprint contained in Cs. The three update nodes can then
be configured in an update set to produce, for instance, the
following configuration of updated nodes in the SML tree.
(k, 〈s〉)
∗
m(Cs) m(Ms)
s
The root of the updated subtree is inserted in the old position
of s and has the value k = (m(Cs)  m(Ms))  s. This
configuration provides independent integrity protection to the
subtree certificate and manifest, and retains the old node
value independently. In particular, attestation to the platform
property represented by Cs can, in this configuration, still be
done without revealing information about s, by quoting only
the left inner node ∗ of the subtree.
Variants of certificate to subtree binding abound. The plat-
form may also want to include (integrity protection values of)
own generated data therein, for instance an internal time stamp
from a secure clock. What makes sense depends ultimately on
the use case.
C. Subtree Validation
For the attestation of the property represented by a sub-
tree certificate to a validator, the platform can quote, using
TPM_Tree_Node_Quote, any node in or above the updated
subtree which protects the intended validation data, which
comprises at least the manifest and the certificate proper.
The platform will then submit validation data as necessary
to the validator, at least all data needed for verification of
the asserted property, again comprising at least Ms and Cs.
Note that the validation data which is already protected by
the submitted quote does in principle not require additional
integrity protection in this.
One important point for the validator is to verify platform
binding of the validation data. It is known that proving
this property, i.e., that the validating platform is the same
that performed subtree certification toward the SCA, is non-
trivial [16]. The simplest way to achieve it is to use the same
AIK, a, in subtree validation as in certification. The platform
would then also submit apub, and if necessary also Ca as part
of the validation data. Whether Ca is needed depends on the
semantics of the subtree certificate, i.e., SC may already have
checked the AIK certificate and Cs may state its veracity.
According information can be placed in the manifest. Re-
using the same AIK partially compromises privacy, and other
methods to solve the problem may be worth further study.
D. Subtree Discovery
An important step for the practical use of subtree certi-
fication is the discovery of subtrees for which a platform
can obtain certificates from a particular SCA. Without going
into details of the interactions between platform, SCA, and
validator, two categories of subtree discovery methods are
described below. The first one places the workload of subtree
discovery with the platform, while the second one assumes a
“dumb” platform and places more load on the SCA.
1) Active Discovery: In this model, the SCA sends some
subtree discovery data to the platform, in the simplest case a
list of node values which it is ready to certify. The platform
can search for these values in its SML tree and perform
subtree certification for each identified node. This baseline
procedure suggests various refinements, in particular enriching
the discovery data and extending the discovery procedure to a
negotiation protocol between platform and SCA. For instance,
discovery data may contain root node positions as conditions
on certifiable roots, which would, in the case of an SML
produced in an authenticated boot process, correspond to the
fact that the components loaded during the build of the latter
subtree are loaded at a defined stage of the platform start
up. Such conditions on absolute positioning of nodes may be
difficult in practise for complex platforms whose configura-
tions may change dynamically. More refined conditions could
therefore also express relative positions of some, e.g., pairs of
certifiable roots. The SC could state expressions saying “s is
certifiable, if it is preceded by r” (i.e., r lies to the left of s
in the ordered SML tree). This can be interpreted to the end
that a certain functionality is operational on the platform only
if another functionality was made operational before it.
A more fundamentally different variant of Model I is that
the discovery data does not consist of subtree roots, i.e., inner
nodes, but rather of leaf, i.e., measurement, values. A “bottom
up” discovery procedure would require that the platform makes
an “educated guess” about which inner nodes are certifiable,
based on the received leaf measurement values which the SCA
asserts to know as trusted values. A simplistic method is to
find the set of span roots of subtrees whose leaves are all in the
discovery data. The platform may then quote a subtree root and
send it together with its SML subtree to the SCA. In general,
the SCA will have to verify the SML subtree and decide if
it is ready to certify that root, since this may still depend on
the order of the leaves. In many cases, the platform may want
to obtain a certificate for a subtree for which the particular
SCA knows only some leaf values, i.e., the leaf set of the
corresponding subtree has gaps with respect to the discovery
data. If the platform has other trusted data, for instance RIM
certificates [3] obtained from a party which the SCA trusts,
the platform could submit these data in Phase 2 of the subtree
certification, to aid SCA with its decision to certify the subtree
root.
2) Passive Discovery: In the case that the device is not
capable to perform a local discovery of subtrees, a model
can be used which moves the computations to the SCA.
The platform selects an inner node n, with the aim to
retrieve certificates from the SCA for any suitable subtrees
below n. The node n could be equal to the root of the
complete tree (V ), in the case that the platform wants to
get all certifiable nodes certified. The next two steps are
the same as described in Phases 1 and 2 in section IV-A,
i.e., the platform performs a TPM_Tree_Node_Quote, or
TPM_Quote, respectively, if V was selected. Wrapped in
an attestation package together with the SML subtree below
the quoted root. The SCA receives this information and can
then, using tree traversal techniques described in [4], verify
the integrity of the tree and concurrently find one or multiple
(disjoint) subtrees Si with certifiable set of roots S. The SCA
then iterates phase 3 of the protocol from IV-A, creating
certificates for all si ∈ S. Since the protocol allows for the
update of multiple nodes, incorporated into the update node
list U , the update of all found subtrees can be done in a single
protocol run. A variant could be for the platform to not send a
TPM_Tree_Node_Quote or TPM_Quote in the first step,
but only provide the SCA with the SML, starting from the
selected node n. The SCA then searches for potential candi-
date subtrees to be certified and then requests the platform to
provide a TPM_Tree_Node_Quote for the root nodes of
the identified subtrees. This is a trade-off in the sense that
it allows the platform to send the SML without having to
perform cryptographic operations in advance. Nevertheless,
the platform must provide appropriate quotes prior to the
certification by the SCA to provide integrity protection for
the sent SML.
V. CONCLUSION
Validation using tree-formed SMLs and verification data
registers adds semantics to remote attestation. The possibility
to attest to subtrees of an SML enables expressiveness far
beyond conventional remote attestation. Tree-formed verifica-
tion data is a promising way to substantiate other proposals to
add semantics to platform attestation, e.g., association and of
properties to validation data, as in PBA.
Further work shall pursue this promising direction and
consider concrete architectures for platform validation with
tree-formed verification and validation data — what we call
tree-formed validation (TFV). One conceivable option is to
efficiently organise a database of reference trees by an SCA
and/or a validator in a way that allows for the modular
building using subtrees of known component sub-structures,
e.g., dependent programs loaded in sequence, or components
with uniform associated security policies. Architectures and
methods for subtree discovery, expression of dependencies
between validated platform components, and management
(updates, remediation) of platforms according to results of
TFV are subjects of ongoing research and shall be discussed
elsewhere.
APPENDIX A
EFFICIENT, SECURE NODE SET UPDATE
As mentioned in Subsection IV-A, the efficiency
of updating a large set U of inner nodes using
TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update depends on
the overlap of the reduced trees of the elements of U , since
many redundant hash operations for verification can occur.
A bulk update strategy can be applied to improve the naïve
algorithm of Phase 5 of the subtree certification protocol,
using only the TPM_Tree_Extend command described
in [4]. It rests on the observation that subsets of the update
set U span subtrees which are independent of the old SML
values, i.e., their roots depend only on nodes in U . Thus the
roots of the trees spanned by such sets can be pre-calculated
without expensive verification.
We first need some definitions. Assume U = {u1, . . . ,uk}
is a dependency-free update set. A node in the SML tree is
called U -intrinsic, if a) it is an element of U , b) its sibling is
in U , or c) its sibling is U -intrinsic. This recursive definition
captures all nodes whose updated values depend only on U
and not on SML nodes in the complement of U . The span
root of a subset V ⊆ U is the unique intersection point of the
traces of all elements of V . The subtree spanned by a subset
V ⊆ U is the union of all traces of elements of V with all
nodes strictly above the span root omitted. Now, the subset V
is called U -intrinsic iff all elements of its spanned subtree are
U -intrinsic.
With these settings, more efficient update of the SML with
U is done as follows.
1) Identify the (mutually disjoint) U -intrinsic subsets
V1, . . . , Vk ⊆ U .
2) Iterate over Vi, i = 1, . . . , k.
a) Normalise the coordinates of elements of Vi by
i) truncating the prefix given by the coordinate of
the span root of Vi, and
ii) post-fixing zeroes until all coordinates have
equal length, the depth of the subtree spanned
by Vi.
b) Order the elements of Vi alphabetically according
to their normalised coordinates, producing an or-
dered list V˜i.
c) Fill up all gaps (in the normalised coordinates) in
V˜i with nil values.
d) Select a free verification data register V ′.
e) Sequentially use TPM_Tree_Extend on the el-
ements of V˜i with target V ′.
f) Remove Vi from U .
g) Insert (V ′, 〈vi〉) into U , where vi is Vi’s span root.
3) For the remaining elements of U , apply the normal
update procedure of Phase 5 in Subsection IV-A using
TPM_Tree_Node_Verified_Update.
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